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Kent E. Calder*

Domestic Political Transformation and
Trans-Pacific Trade Relations

In 1970, as the bitter trans-Pacific conflicts of the early 1970s began to
escalate, the U.S.-Japan trade deficit was $1.2 billion. It never rose
above $3 billion at any point during that stormy period. By 1987 the
U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan had reached forty times the 1970
amount; it was accompanied by large-scale deficits with Taiwan, South
Korea, Hong Kong, and even Singapore, of which few observers in the
early 1970s would have dreamed. The only remaining major U.S. trade
surplus in the Pacific was with Australia. Eighty-six and a half percent of
the expansion in U.S.-Japan trade between 1980 and 1986 had consisted
ofJapanese exports to the United States, and patterns with nations elsewhere in the region were generally similar.'
Trans-Pacific tensions in the 1980s remained remarkably muted,
considering the magnitude of the economic imbalances. In 1982 Congress defeated local content legislation for automobiles, which proposed
practices long prevailing in much of Western Europe, and in 1986 it
failed to override presidential vetoes of protectionist textile-trade legislation. In the late 1980s the Executive Branch abandoned its insistence
on voluntary Japanese restraints on exports of autos to the United States
which it had demanded in 1981. Following the decisive defeat of Richard Gephardt in the strategic Super Tuesday regional presidential primary of 1988, Congress passed an Omnibus Trade Bill conspicuous for
its lack of strong protectionist trade provisions.
As import penetration rose in the United States during the 1980s,
interest groups, and even U.S. commerce and trade authorities,
launched a rash of anti-dumping and unfair trading practice investigations in specific, narrow product lines, moving to an unprecedented
retaliatory tariff on Japanese electronic products in early 1987. While
the emergence of this so-called "Section 301 regime," named after the
relevant unfair trading practices clause of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,
has attracted considerable media attention and conveys the impression
*
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of a bitter and pervasive U.S.-Japan conflict emerging, the commercial
stakes in the specific cases litigated are relatively small. Furthermore,
the acceptance rate of domestic industry claims has remained low, and
the remedies provided by the federal government modest, even as trade
2
litigation, together with the U.S. trade deficit was steadily increased.
The broader framework of trade and financial relations thus
remains fundamentally stable, if often tense at the actual negotiating
level. The Bush Administration continues to stand forthrightly for an
open trade and financial system, despite the manifest economic costs,
and for close diplomatic ties with Japan and other nations of East Asia.
Increasingly, influential state and local authorities are also forging active
links throughout the Pacific-links that in many cases did not even exist
at the beginning of the decade. In short, the United States in the 1980s
does not appear to have been on a clear "slippery slope" toward protectionism, despite periodic abridgement (less than most other major
nations) of liberal economic principles.
I.

Domestic Political Transformation (1970-1985)

At the root of the remarkably mild U.S. response to large trade deficits
and the rapid build-up in foreign debt during the 1980s has been fundamental change, since the early 1970s, in the structure of the American
domestic political economy. One development has been the nation's
sharpening segmentation. Two oil shocks since 1973, the vast acceleration of defense procurements, with contracts favoring some regions over
others, and the rapid pace of technological change over the past decade
have all stimulated the emergence of different Americas, with both
decline and new prosperity in evidence. As a consequence, opinion and
interest concerning global trade issues has differed more and more
along sectoral and regional lines.
Throughout most of the past twenty years, the South and the West
of the United States, broadly speaking, have gained steadily relative to
the rest of the country in both population and share of aggregate
national wealth. By 1990 the combined populations of these areas are
expected to account for around 56% of the U.S. total. 3 Despite deep
recession in Texas and neighboring parts of the Southwest during the
mid-1980s caused by the sharp fall in oil prices, inflation-adjusted
incomes have grown twice as fast in the South and West as in the Northeast and Midwest over the past two decades.
During the 1980s new growth points have also emerged, tied to
defense and service-industry development, in such states as New York,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts. These developments, like the depression in the southwestern oil industry, have narrowed some of the broad,
2. See Goldstein, The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection, 80 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 161 (1986).
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 1-3 (1987).
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regionally specific contrasts between growth and prosperity, implicit in
the "Sunbelt shift" pattern of the 1970s, to create a more nuanced picture.* But the complex interweaving of prosperity and depression in
Snowbelt states has complicated protectionist efforts there, as is clear,
for example, in Ohio. While the heavy industries around Cleveland and
Youngstown have been badly depressed, central Ohio has been more
buoyant, stimulated by projects such as the new Honda auto plant in
Marysville.
The continuing shifts in the locus of economic power in the United
States have encouraged parallel shifts in patterns of political influence,
which have in turn reinforced the ongoing economic shifts. Every president elected to office since Lyndon B. Johnson has had a substantial
southern or western political background, including Richard Nixon,
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush. Gerald Ford, who
does not fit that qualification, was not elected, but succeeded to office
following the Nixon resignation. For a century before that a southern or
western background was a rarity among chief executives. In addition,
for the past two generations, the chairmen of major congressional committees have tended to be Westerners and, especially, Southerners. In
the Super Tuesday regional presidential primary of March 1988 the
South once again showed its strategic political influence, assuring the
Republican nomination of transplanted Texan George Bush, and
grievously wounding protectionist Democrat Richard Gephardt. In the
November 1988 general election a solid Republican South was likewise
central to the defeat of Michael Dukakis, who was more assertive on
trade issues than his GOP rival.
The increasingly salient regional and sectoral divisions in the American political economy have, since the late 1960s, coincided ever more
closely with attitudes concerning trade policy toward Japan. Generally
speaking, protectionist sentiments have been concentrated in the relatively stagnant, heavily unionized, industrialized centers of the Northeast and Midwest, which have borne the brunt of competition with
Japan. Unemployment rates during the first half of the 1980s across this
so-called Rustbelt have frequently been double the national average,
and anti-Japanese protectionist feeling has been high, as expressed in
state-enacted "Buy America" legislation and strong support for federal
domestic content legislation.
Despite the rising vehemence of anti-Japanese sentiment in these
areas, there have been important regional counter-trends which have
prevented a protectionist common front from emerging, even in relatively depressed Rustbelt areas. Several industrial states, including
Ohio, NewJersey, and recently even Michigan, have sought and successfully attracted Japanese investment. In addition, the service industries
rising throughout the country, especially banks, law firms, and consulting companies, have often had a major stake in transactions with Japan
and other nations of the Pacific Basin.
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The South and West, together with the financial centers of the
United States, have generally favored free trade more strongly than
other parts of the country. Underlying this relatively liberal orientation
have been strong complementarities of economic interest with Japan
and other manufacturers of the Pacific Rim. For example, there is not a
single integrated steel mill on the entire American West Coast. The
only auto plant there is the recently opened General Motors-Toyota
joint venture plant at Fremont, California. Even in the semiconductor
industry, Silicon Valley's relatively hard attitude toward Japan has been
moderated by a broad market segmentation: California producers specialize in microprocessors and customized chips, while Japanese produ4
cers specialize in commodity RAM chips.
Roughly one-third of the entire U.S. trade deficit with Japan is
accounted for by the trade that passes through California ports. Yet this
has stirred remarkably little antagonism in California, due to the transPacific economic complementarity and the state's relatively rapid
growth. Indeed, San Francisco, San Diego, and Long Beach-like Seattle and Portland-profit substantially from shipping to and from East
Asia, regardless of which direction trade predominantly flows. In addition, the auto and electronics dealer networks, which have a substantial
stake in a smooth flow of imports, are large and vocal. And across the
West, union membership as a proportion of total employment (excluding agriculture) ranges from a low of under 13% in a right-to-work state
like Arizona to around 25% in California and 33% in Washington. 5
This is lower than the 20% to 35% union membership ratios more common in the Midwest and Northeast. 6
Like the West, the South tends, broadly speaking, to be economically complementary with Japan and has been relatively quiescent on
trade issues, aside from textiles. Its lukewarm response in early 1988 to
Democratic presidential hopeful Richard Gephardt's protection-oriented trade policy and the deindustrialization concerns of Michael
Dukakis flowed in part from this underlying economic structure. The
major southern exports are agricultural: soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, and tobacco. The beef and orange trade questions that have
caused so much U.S.-Japanese political friction are not major issues in
the South, except in Florida. Moreover, Japan imports nearly $6 billion
annually in agricultural products from the United States-mostly from
7
the South.
Historically, the South has had a pronounced free-trade orientation.
In addition, a great deal of Japan's rising investment in the United
4. For further details, see Calder, The Emerging Politics of the Trans-PacificEconomy,
2

WORLD POL'YJ. 593 (1985).
5. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at 401 (108th ed. 1988) (1982 figures).

6. Id.
7. In 1987 U.S. agricultural exports to Japan were over $5.7 billion. See KEIZAI
KoHo CENTER, JAPAN 1989: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 19 (1989). Statistics are
drawn from U.S. Department of Agriculture data.
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States-projects such as Nissan's truck plant at Smyrna, Tennessee-has
been concentrated there, with most of the rest in other Sunbelt states
such as California. Well over half ofJapanese manufacturing investment
in the United States during the mid-1980s was concentrated in sixteen
Sunbelt states; the top three were California, Texas, and Georgia. Yet
enough investment is distributed elsewhere to undercut protectionist
activity even in the Rustbelt states most adversely affected by economic
competition with Japan, such as Michigan and Ohio. Japanese direct
investment in the United States, totalling more than $50 billion in 1988,
already provides over 250,000 jobs, with this number expected to quadruple to over one million jobs by the year 2000.8
Like the economically healthy regions, the sectors of the U.S. economy that have grown vigorously over the past decade have been in a
broadly symbiotic relationship with Japan and other major East Asian
industrial exporters. For the construction industry, Japan and South
Korea have often offered cheaper steel or better delivery times, and,
hence, increased profits on bids. In finance, Japan has provided
increased market opportunities; a wide range of American banks with
fund surpluses, many of them regional and local, have benefited by
financing much ofJapan's rapidly growing dollar-based trade and investment. Since the mid-1980s, a growing number of U.S. state and local
governments have also been raising funds in Japan for a broad range of
public purposes, and their activities may be widened to include other
nations of the Pacific with major capital surpluses.
Reinforcing these regional and sectoral complementarities with
Japan and its neighbors are the growing stakes that many U.S. multinational firms have in maintaining smooth trans-Pacific relations. These
stakes are especially high in the electronics, banking, energy, and automotive sectors that are so central to the U.S. political economy. By the
end of 1986, direct U.S. investment in Japan was $11.3 billion and rising, particularly in high-technology sectors. For example, Texas Instruments produced all the 64K RAM computer chips for its global
operations in Japan, IBM sourced over half of its IBM PC components
there, and General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler all made heavy captive
exports to the United States from Japan of both components and finished automobiles.
To a much greater extent than most Americans realize, Japan's
trans-Pacific trade surplus stems from the sourcing decisions of such
multinationals as IBM, together with those of major U.S. distributors,
rather than from autonomous export drives by Japanese firms. Over
10% ofJapan's exports to the United States in the mid-1980s consisted
of parts exports-largely to U.S. firms. The Big Three sourcing in Japan
of auto parts alone came to over $1 billion in 1986. Roughly 7% of
8. The estimate of one million jobs by the year 2000 is from MITI. See Holstein,
Japan, C.S.A., Bus. WEEK, July 14, 1986, at 46. On direct investment, see KEIZAI
KoHo CENTER, supra note 7, at 56. Figures are for the accumulated value of approvals
and notifications.
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Japan's U.S.-bound exports are items like video tape recorders and 35millimeter cameras that are virtually not produced in the United States,
yet are marketed by U.S. retailers underJapanese brand names. 9 A further 2 to 3% ofJapan's exports to the United States are sold under the
private brand names of U.S. distributors-Japanese-made Sears home
appliances, for example. Finally, around 5% of Japan's exports to the
United States represent exports of finished products from Japan to the
United States by foreign firms-largely American-that manufacture in
Japan. In short, over a quarter ofJapan's current exports to the United
States appears to be structurally linked to the production and marketing
activities of U.S. firms in their home territory. Thus, U.S. firms have a
massive economic interest in imports fromJapan; in practice this inevitably limits the options of U.S. policymakers. A predictably strong
exchange value for the yen, continuing over a period of some years, may
be required to change this. Even then, change will probably occur only
slowly.
The explosive growth of Japanese capital markets during the mid1980s has inspired additional interest among multinationals in assuring
smooth dealings with Japan, for they see potentially enormous opportunities in funding, underwriting, and brokerage activities. The Tokyo
bond market, well over five times the scale of 1980, passed London to
become the second largest in the world during 1984. In mid-1987 the
Tokyo Stock Exchange passed even New York's to become the largest in
the world, in terms of market capitalization. Between 1984 and 1987,
virtually all the major American multinational financial firms sharply
increased their securities and merchant banking staffs in Tokyo, sensing
an expanded global role for the yen as well as rapidly growing offshore
dealings there in Western currencies. By 1988, U.S. banks were handling the bulk of the 45% foreign share of foreign-exchange trading in
Tokyo, a highly lucrative business. 10
Traditionally, much ofJapan's attractiveness for U.S. multinationals
has been rooted in profitability. Although U.S. companies employed
only 1% of the Japanese work force during 1982, they registered 3.3%
of the corporate profits injapan. I Over the past 15 years, the return on
investment of U.S. manufacturing firms in Japan has averaged roughly
twice the return realized by U.S. affiliates in Canada, the United King12
dom, or France.
In addition to Japan's profitable domestic markets, made ever more
lucrative by a strengthening yen, U.S. multinationals often find in Japan
an excellent production base for sourcing operations worldwide. Both
9. See TsusHo SANGYO SHO, supra note 1 (1987 ed.).
10. Holden, Look Who's Wi7nnihg Tokyo s Currency Sweepstakes, Bus. WK., Apr. 11,

1988, at 71. For a detailed review of changes in the Japanese financial markets, see
Semkow, Emergence of Derivative FinancialProducts Markets in Japan, 22 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 39 (1989).
11. American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (unpublished data).
12. Id.
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the quality of the work force and the favorable regulatory climate seem
to have encouraged this development, which has persisted despite the
yen's post-Plaza strength. Since 1982, U.S. firms in Japan have been eligible for Japan Development Bank loans on a case-by-case basis and
have received low-interest government small-business financing as
well. 13 Favorable regional development incentives are being given to
U.S. high-technology firms willing to start up operations in Japan, and
export financing is reportedly available for global sales from Japanese
production bases. Opportunities for American financiers are also
expanding in such areas as trust and investment banking.
American multinationals have grown increasingly active in U.S.
trade policy formation since 1970, as they have come to perceive their
interests threatened by protectionist sentiment both in Congress and
abroad. Generally this rising activism on the part of multinationals,
through such groups as the Emergency Committee for American Trade
(ECAT), has helped keep U.S. markets open to Japanese imports-a
substantial and rising share of which, as noted above, has been captive
imports by U.S. multinationals from Japan to the United States. Since
1981, the AT&T consent decree, the end to the Justice Department suit
against IBM, and the Reagan and Bush administrations' generally supportive attitude toward multinationals have significantly increased the
leverage such firms can exert on behalf of free-trade policies.
A parallel development has been the rising activism and influence
on Congress of major distributors-a result of their growing stakes in an
open trade regime. Companies like Sears Roebuck and K-Mart,
together with the smaller-scale automobile and appliance distributors,
have massively increased their foreign sourcing over the past decade to
their considerable profit. The strength of the dollar between 1981 and
1985 increased this profitability, insofar as an oligopolistic market structure prevented exchange-rate windfalls from being passed on to the consumer. Even the sharp revaluation of the yen during 1985-1987 did not
extinguish foreign sourcing, both because Japanese exporters absorbed
much of the exchange rate shift and because many of the imported
goods handled by distributors came from newly industrializing countries
(NICs) like South Korea and Taiwan, whose currencies did not rapidly
appreciate. The business contacts of U.S. distributors simply broadened
to new areas of the Pacific Basin. The distributors are said to be highly
active on Capitol Hill; the fact that their outlets are scattered across a
broad geographic area and that local distributors are often intimately
involved in grass-roots politics, serve to enhance these firms' political
influence.' 4 Because distributors can benefit from any sort of merchan13. As of March 31, 1986, the Japan Development Bank had $78.9 million in
loans outstanding to foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Japan and a further
$292.0 million out to 50-50 joint ventures, with most loans being made to U.S.-affiliated companies. See JAPAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 15.
14. For example, distributors were influential in the defeat of domestic content
legistation for automobiles in 1982 and tightened quotas for textile imports in 1985.
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dise transaction, and because Japanese manufacturers have placed a
high priority on establishing and rewarding a distribution network, these
distribution firms have become powerful open-trade advocates.
A little noticed but increasingly active and potent political ally in the
United States of an open trade and financial regime is state and local
government. With the gradual retrenchment in non-defense, federal
government spending over the past fifteen years and the active devolution of governmental functions to the states encouraged by the Nixon,
Ford, and Reagan Administrations, local government's role in the overall federal system has expanded.' 5 Although promotion of new investment was a traditional function of local governments long before the
recent expansion of their responsibilities, local governments have now
fervently seized the expansion of foreign investment as a major new
opportunity to address the policy demands and long-run revenue concerns which recent federal budget cutbacks have placed on them.
State and local governments have taken generally moderate policy
stands on international trade and financial policy questions which they
have addressed. Indiana Governor Robert Orr's 1987 opposition to
congressional sanctions against Toshiba, in the wake of the Toshiba
Machine Tools technology-diffusion scandal, with a major Toshiba
plant-investment decision in the U.S. pending is a typical case in point.
Thirty American states had representatives in Tokyo at the end of 1987,
with most of them oriented toward investment and export promotion.16
With Japanese investment alone in the United States expected to rise
tenfold over the next fifteen years, creating a fourfold increase in jobs
and possibly an even greater rise in local tax revenues, 17 the non-federal
element of government in the United States may well be a force for
moderation and for deepening trans-Pacific integration, possible tensions due to cultural differences notwithstanding.
In addition to this support from multinationals, distributors, and
local governments, foreign firms striving to preserve an open trade
regime have potent help from Washington's largest corps of professional lobbyists. In the mid-1980s, lobbyists for the Japanese government and private sector, working both to catalyze the diverse supporters
of an open trade system in the U.S. and to explain U.S. realities in Japan,
reported fees double those received by representatives of any other
nation. Knowledgeable Washington analysts estimate total Japanese
lobbying expenditures at over $60 million annually, including outlays
for which formal reports are not required. I One out of every five registered Washington lobbyists in 1987 worked forJapanese firms,Japanese
See I.

DESTLER &J. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED STATES
TRADE POLITICS 49-56 (1987 Institute for International Economics 21).

15. See R. NATHAN & F. DOLITTLE, REAGAN AND THE STATES (1987).

16. State Offices in Tokyo: "Selling Out" the US.?, ToKYo J., Dec. 1987, at 15.
17. See Laderman, TWhat the Rally Really .Means, Bus. WK., FEB. 2, 1987, AT 58. See
also Holstein,Japan is 1h'ining Fiends in the Rust Belt, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1987, at 54.
18. See Farnsworth,AntericansIWho LobbyforJapan, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, sec. 3,

p. 4, col. 3.
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industry associations, or the Japanese government, with these lobbyists
garnering 30% of the fees paid to all registered lobbyists combined. 19
Since congressional decision-making processes have become much
more complicated over the past fifteen years, as the subcommittee system has expanded, there are now many more access points at which
outside groups can exert their influence. Japan's representatives, and
those of other foreign economic partners of the United States, clearly
benefit from this situation.
Just as the political and economic strength of U.S. groups with
interests complementary to those of other Pacific economies has risen
since 1970, the position of antagonistic groups has declined. Most notably, the political clout of organized labor has fallen sharply, as a result of
high manufacturing-sector unemployment, declining union membership, and the anti-labor sentiment of much of the conservative Sunbelt
coalition. According to AFL-CIO estimates, union membership
declined from 35% of the work force in 1955 to less than 19% in
1985.20 This drop has been especially steep since the 1979 oil shock.
Between 1981 and 1983, for example, union membership declined by
800,000. The membership of the United Steelworkers Union has fallen
by half-from 1.062 million to 572,000- between 1975 and 1985, with
most of the decline since 1980.21 Other indications of the erosion of
labor's position include the union concessions and give-backs that have
been common in recent labor agreements, the 1982 failure of domestic
content legislation and other protectionist efforts, and the misfortunes
in 1984 of the AFL-CIO's endorsed candidate Walter Mondale-his difficulties against Gary Hart in the primaries and his subsequent sweeping
defeat by Ronald Reagan. The difficulties of Richard Gephardt in the
1988 presidential campaign point in the same direction.
Structural transformation within the American political economy
will never be complete because the process of change is a continuing
one. The effects of that transformation are mediated through two major
political parties, which in the American context stand, to some degree,
on contrasting social bases. The Democratic Party has had more sympathy for and stronger ties to Snowbelt and organized labor groups
adversely affected by the emergence of the trans-Pacific economy than
has the Republican Party and tends to be more solicitous of these disadvantaged groups.
But as noted above, the role of organized labor in the American
work force is in a process of long-term decline. The locus of influence in
both the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole has shifted elsewhere, as the travails of Walter Mondale and Richard Gephardt in the
1984 and 1988 campaigns would seem to indicate. Suburban and
minority inner-city electorates appear to have gained relative salience
19. Id.
20. Serrin, Unionism Struggles Through Middle Age, N.Y. Times, Sec. 4, p. 4. col. 3.
21. Id.
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for Democrats. More generally, the decline of organization in American
politics, a continuing phenomenon since at least the 1950s, has made it
more difficult for groups affected adversely by economic change to
express their opposition effectively through the political process.
II. Confronting the Consequences (1985-1989)
Transformation in the structure of the American domestic political
economy during the 1970s and early 1980s helped sustain a remarkably
open orientation in U.S. trade and investment policy, through a period
of depression in American industry and agriculture in the Midwest and
Northeast during the early 1980s. This openness toward imports and
foreign investment accompanied the strong dollar and the huge currentaccount deficits generated by the Reagan Administration's simultaneous
defense buildup and tax cut. But the obverse side of this openness, and
the resulting economic efficiencies, has been an erosion of the American
industrial base, a structural dependence on imports, and a political
obliviousness to the rapid escalation of U.S. foreign debt at a pace
which, in the long run, is not sustainable. At the end of 1988, net U.S.
external liabilities were well over $400 billion and were increasing at a
rate of $150 billion annually. By the early 1990s, if recent trends continue, the annual U.S. foreign debt service burden will be as large as the
current yearly U.S.-Japan trade deficit.
The emergence of the trans-Pacific economy, in short, has meant a
surge of imports, stimulating competition, and an escalation of debt.
These are mere abstractions until they must be paid back through a real
decline in living standards vis-A-vis more productive parts of the Pacific
Basin. But that reckoning day must inevitably come.
Throughout the early 1980s, the United States was insulated from
the long-run consequences of its declining productivity and rising debt
by the anomalous strength of the dollar and the consequent eagerness
of foreigners to invest in the United States. But following the Plaza
International Monetary Accords of September, 1985, and the steady
subsequent revaluation of the yen and the Deutschmark, those inevitable long-run consequences have become increasing clear. Within little
more than two years, the purchasing power of the yen in the United
States doubled while the value of dollars in Tokyo conversely fell to half
of pre-Plaza levels. Although American exports to Japan were frustratingly slow to rise, in part due to the complexity of the Japanese distribution system and the large share of the exchange-rate profits to the
Japanese nation as a whole which it absorbed, Japanese investment in
the United States rapidly surged. In 1988, Japanese direct foreign
investments in the United States rose to over $50 billion, nearly 50%
higher than the previous year.2 2 This new surge of Japanese direct
investment in the U.S. generated a range of new trans-Pacific economic
policy issues, such as the propriety of government restrictions on joint
22.

KEIZAi KOHO CENTER, supra note

7, at 56.
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ventures and acquisitions like the abortive Fujitsu effort to acquire
Fairchild Semiconductors in 1987.
Among the perverse long-run consequences of the overvalued dollar of the early 1980s, in the context of an emerging trans-Pacific economy, was the heavy and rapid erosion of the U.S. industrial base in
semiconductors, particularly in advanced memory components. To offset some of the losses it suffered, the semiconductor industry went to
the government. What followed, during 1986-1987, was a clumsy intrusion of government into U.S.-Japan high-technology trade which from
the beginning had dubious objectives, limited prospects of success, and
which ultimately aggravated U.S.-Japan relations without achieving substantial new market opportunities for American firms in Japan. MITI
and the U.S. Department of Commerce negotiated an agreement to set
guidelines for semiconductor prices and U.S. market shares in Japan.
That agreement rapidly proved unenforceable, leading in the spring of
1987 to recriminations and the first U.S. retaliatory tariffs on Japanese
exports to the United States since World War II.
At a bilateral level, the emergence of the trans-Pacific economy during the 1970s and the early 1980s stimulated deepening economic and
political interdependence between the United States andJapan, and frictions inevitably arose. Increasing American and Japanese intimacy had
even more important implications for both nations in the global political
economy as a whole. As the world's largest creditor and debtor, with
credits and debits of well over $200 billion and $400 billion respectively
at the end of 1988, Japan and the United States find themselves the central actors in the international financial system. They are jointly responsible, to an unprecedented degree for two nations, for the stability of
global exchange rates and capital markets. 23 In addition, by consuming
nearly 40% of world oil imports, the two nations also have a fundamental stake in the stability of world energy markets and powerful incentives
24
to cooperate to ensure that stability.
Perhaps the most important consequences of the emerging transPacific economy are its profound implications for the national security of
the United States and its allies, including Japan. As Robert Gilpin has
pointed out, Japan since the late 1970s has become the most powerful
and strategic supporter of American global hegemony, assuming a role
played in the early postwar period by Great Britain and subsequently by
West Germany. 2 5 The principal mechanism of Japanese financial support until mid-1987 was Japanese private-sector portfolio investment in
23. Analysts on both sides of the Pacific are thus speaking of a "G-2" condominium dominating the international monetary system. See Bergsten, Economic hnbalances and World Politics, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 770, 789-793 (1987); Y. YoICHI, NIHIBEI
KEIZAI MASATSU [Japan-U.S. Economic Friction] 194-230 (1987).
24. On the U.S. andJapanese roles in global energy markets, see R. VERNON, Two
HUNGRY GIANTS: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE QUEST FOR OIL AND ORES

(1983).
25. R.
(1987).

GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

134-51
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the United States, which reached roughly $100 billion in 1986. During
1987-1988, capital flows from Japan continued, although increasingly in
the form of official flows. Bank of Japan holdings of dollar assets, for
example, increased more than $30 billion for the second half of 1987.
Due to these huge capital inflows from Japan, which began just as the
Reagan Administration began its major defense buildup, the United
States was able to sustain both its huge defense buildup of the early
1980s and one of the most rapid rates of overall growth and employment creation among the major industrialized nations without suffering
a debilitating and politically disastrous credit crunch.
For the 1990s, American global defense commitments continue to
loom large. But the intractable U.S. fiscal deficit and the increasing
reluctance of foreign investors to fund it has cast into increasing doubt
the United States' economic ability to sustain existing global commitments. Exchange-rate realignments set in motion by the Plaza accords
give Japan, together with West Germany, increasing economic capacity
to share the American security burden. This ability has been enhanced
still further in the Japanese case by the administrative reforms and
domestic subsidy cutbacks of the early 1980s, coupled with important
changes in the tax structure introduced during 1988 by the Takeshita
administration. Japan is increasingly capable of shouldering the cost of
U.S. defense burdens, if it can be persuaded politically to do so.
During the early 1980s Japan steadily increased its so-called "strategic foreign aid" to nations like Pakistan, Thailand, and the Sudan, which
were of demonstrable military-political importance to the United States.
Since 1979 Japan has also been the largest source of foreign aid to the
Philippines, increasing its support sharply following the downfall of the
Marcos regime. For fiscal 1989Japanese low-interest credits to the Philippines reached 88.6 billion yen ($728 million).2 6 By comparison,
American assistance to nations hosting American bases was $1.47 billion
in fiscal 1988, up from $941 million in 1980, although still $700 million
less than the Reagan Administration requested in 1988 from Congress. 2 7 Japan, whose overseas foreign assistance became the largest in
the world in 1989, could expect to pick up an increasing share of such
costs in the future while also assuming under an indirect offset arrangement some share of the $6 billion expended annually by the United
States for actual operation of its foreign military bases.
As the United States and Japan look to the future of a relationship
that has come to have fundamental importance on the global scene, the
underlying structure of their bilateral ties remains remarkably similar to
the pattern with which they began their independent relationship at the
end of Allied Occupation nearly forty years ago. The United States sup26. Japan Econ.J., Dec. 10, 1988. These loans carried an annual interest rate of
2.7%, over 25 to 30 years.

27. The nations in question were Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the Philip-

pines. 1988 figures represented subcommittee recommendations with supplemental
funding expected for the Philippines.
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plies the military security while serving also as defender of open global
markets for trade and finance which strongly benefit Japan and other
U.S. allies. The rapid accumulation of American foreign debt, and the
increasing reluctance of foreign investors to fund it, suggest with
increasing urgency that the status quo is not indefinitely viable. The
pressing challenge to both the United States and Japan is to find a
means of smoothly sharing the economic burdens of global leadership
so as to preserve the economic and security regime which has brought
unprecedented prosperity to both of them, and to the world as a whole,
since its inception four decades ago.

